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ABSTRACT
To what extent are young people’s attitudes toward environmental issues part of
broader culture patterns? Based on a survey of 3,810 Norwegian young people aged
15-22, four culture profiles were identified through factor analysis. Environmental
orientation was measured by means of the New Ecological Paradigm scale, the
importance ascribed to sustained economic growth and to fighting pollution, and
membership in environmental organizations. Different aspects of environmental
orientation turned out to be tied to different culture profiles, and through these profiles
also to class and gender. Two extremes emerged. A ’critical’ environmental perspective
(resembling a ’deep ecology’ position) was closely tied to a culture profile labelled
’radical counterculture’, which had its basis within the ’humanistic social intermediate
strata’. Anti-environmental attitudes were closely tied to a culture profile labelled
’redneck’, based within the manual working class. However, no culture profile emerged
as exclusively ’environmentalist’, in that three profiles (all except ’redneck’) were tied to
some ’environment friendly’ attitudes. The findings point to the importance of avoiding
simplistic interpretations of environmental concern as a unidimensional phenomenon
ranging from strong to weak.
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1. Introduction
How should we understand concepts like
’environmental awareness’ and ’environmental
concern’, and how does such awareness or
concern come about? Although some discussion
of the concepts is present in empirical studies of
how humans think and feel about the environ-
ment, there is generally not much attention
being paid to the obvious diversity of attitudes
that could be labelled ’pro-environmental’.
Personal experience and various forms of
information, be it through media coverage,
government campaigns or environmental edu-
cation, will affect the development of environ-
mental concern. However, such factors are
obviously not the only ones that influence
attitudes and beliefs. Simple everyday observa-
tions reveal a great diversity of attitude
packages concerning environmental problems
and human relations to nature. This diversity
cannot possibly stem only from differential
access to information or from variations in
personal experience of environmental problems.
If we want to influence people’s attitudes
toward the environment, we must understand
how such attitudes are part of systems of
interpretation and meaning - that is, how
they are embedded in culture patterns. If such
patterns bestow different meanings upon the
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same issue in different segments of the popu-
lace, then we are simply not talking about the
same thing. Driving cars is a pivotal culture
element for some working class youngsters
(Skogen 1998), loaded with symbolic meanings
regarding masculinity, technical skills and free-
dom. For them, information about the advan-
tages (environmental and otherwise) of public
transportation does not touch the core of the
behaviour we want to alter. Like health infor-
mation campaigns, many attempts to commu-
nicate environmental messages are based on a
very primitive conception of the relationship
between information and attitudes: if the
information is sufficiently clear and logical,
then people will understand how things ’really’
are, and how to act accordingly. As we know,
the impact of health information differs sub-
stantially from one group to another, depending
among other things on the meanings attributed
to the detrimental behaviours in question.
Smoking, drinking and eating meat mean
different things to different groups, and the
senders of messages about negative health
effects also have very different standings with
different groups. The parallels to communica-
tion about environmental issues are obvious.
Several perspectives on the formation of
environmental concern exist within the social
sciences. Beck (1992) argues that industrial
society has entered a new era, where global
hazards brought about by new technology and
economic internationalization are forging new
alliances based on shared risks. Beck also ties
the handling of risk perception to the indivi-
dualization process characteristic of the era he
labels ’reflexive modernity’, where moderniza-
tion is gradually releasing people from struc-
tural constraints. This provides a foundation for
challenging established scientific and technical
’truths’ (about the impact of technology on the
environment, for example), as the power bases
for indisputable knowledge are crumbling due
to structural and cultural change.
Douglas (1992) focuses on the individual-
ism of the contemporary dominant culture in
western industrialized societies. This cultural
trait places the safety of individuals at center
stage, and at the same time traditional knowl-
edge systems are challenged through the
individualization of knowledge. Reasonably
resourceful groups that feel aggrieved can
utilize what they perceive as knowledge about
environmental risk to cast blame on those they
feel are responsible for putting people’s (or the
planet’s) health and well-being at risk. Casting
blame on certain groups for causing danger or
damage has always been used politically, but
what is new is the universal opportunity to do
so.
Although Beck and Douglas stress the
cultural and collective dimensions of environ-
mental risk perception in contemporary indus-
trialized societies, environmental danger
jeopardizing the health and happiness of indi-
viduals is at the heart of the matter. However,
both seem to deal with risk perception without
much explicit empirical foundation (cf. Draper
1993). How, and in what forms, environmental
awareness is evolving (for example, what part
the perception of individual risk actually plays)
therefore seems to remain a matter of con-
jecture. Precisely how the obviously quite
diverse forms of awareness are distributed
among different groups is no chief concern
with any of them.
What might be termed ’culturalist’ theories
of new social movements (Scott 1990) focus on
ideological ecology as part of cultural forms
emerging in the new fields of social conflict that
spring from the transition into post-industrial
society. In this perspective, the new environ-
mental movement is a counterculture move-
ment against modernity (Eder 1993), or an
exponent of a new reflexivity, embedded in new
cultural and cognitive patterns (Touraine
1981). Environmental awareness is seen as
part of a cultural and ideological package,
comprising ’a relationship with nature opposed
to the institutionalized, dominant relationship
defined by the idea that man should conquer
nature’ (Eder 1993:130), and a fundamental
critique of industrial capitalism. Such an under-
standing of the paradigmatic foundation of the
new environmental movement touches upon
core principles within the philosophical per-
spective of ’deep ecology’. Perhaps the most
crucial aspect of deep ecology is the concept of
ecocentrism, as opposed to the anthropocentr-
ism that is central not only to industrialism, but
also to the ’shallow ecology’ movement. ’Shal-
low ecology’ is the basis for fighting pollution
and resource depletion with an aim to secure
the health and affluence of people in the
developed countries, whereas the ecocentric
worldview holds that humans are an integral
part of nature as a totality. This should
eventually form a basis for solidarity with all
of nature, because we are part of it and it is part
of us (Naess 1973; Deval 1991; Eckersley
1992).
But who exactly is mobilized in the
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ecological movement? The issue of class is
central to analyses of the environmental move-
ment in this perspective. The dominance of
certain middle-class fractions within the envir-
onmental movement is empirically beyond
dispute. Studies conducted in several industria-
lized countries conclude that it derives its
fundamental support from those groups within
the middle class that are highly educated,
employed in ’non-productive’ sectors (public
services, teaching, arts, etc.) and have incomes
in the medium range (Cotgrove & Duff 1980;
Morrison & Dunlap 1986; Kriesi 1989;
Eckersley 1989). The ’new middle classes’ are
’doubly opposed to the class structure of
industrialized societies: opposed to its dominant
classes and opposed to its dominated classes’
(Eder 1993:134). They possess the cultural
characteristics that, along with the environ-
mental threats to the high quality of life they
value so much, make them the vanguard of the
ecology movement seen as a counterculture
movement.
We have now dealt with the environmental
movement. However, we may assume that
similar links between culture patterns and
environmental attitude formation exist in the
general population. That is, in the vast majority
of people who do not in any sense participate in
the environmental movement, but among
whom scores of different combinations of
attitudes toward the environment can surely
be found. The concept of ’environmental
orientation’ is meant to cover orientation, or
attitudes, toward nature and our physical
environment regardless of congruence with
views central to environmentalism. Such orien-
tation will obviously be part of a general
’worldview’, which is always closely tied to
culture patterns.
It seems fruitful to consider the risk
perception perspective and the cultural shift
perspective as complementary contributions.
Following this line of thought, we may hypothe-
size that forms of environmental concern that
are tied to the perception of threats to the health
and well-being of individuals are not very
strongly tied to particular culture patterns.
Such forms of concern could be expected to
prevail throughout the population, along with
concern for other threats to life quality, such as
crime, unemployment or health hazards. On the
other hand, forms of environmental concern
that approach a ’deep ecology’ perspective, and
comprise a critical stance toward industrialism
itself, could be expected to be more closely tied to
particular culture patterns; patterns that
include or facilitate a critique of multiple
features of modern society. However, rather
than ’shallow’ and ’deep’, the terms ’pragmatic’
and ’critical’ have much to recommend them,
not least in order to keep some distance from the
strong normative core of the philosophical
tendency of deep ecology
The focus of this article is young people’s
environmental concern. This is important for
several reasons. First, in the public discourse the
environmental movement is often associated
with youth. Young people are frequently the
most visible participants in spectacular actions
undertaken by environmental organizations.
Young people are also supposed to have a
strong interest in preserving the environment,
as they ’shall inherit the earth’. Secondly, some
scholars perceive youth as particularly suscep-
tible to the social forces of the late modern era.
The old collective identities, which were mainly
rooted in class positions now eroded through
the decline of industrial manufacturing and the
expansion of the educational system, are
thought to have lost their grip on the identity
formation that takes place in adolescence. The
ensuing process of ’individualization’ leaves
individuals to themselves when facing the
formidable task of constructing their identities
(cf. Beck 1992; Lash 1994; Melucci 1996). In
this perspective, the new social movements are
particularly interesting as arenas for identity
formation, as they could be regarded as
’laboratories for the creation of personal iden-
tities’ (Peterson & Thorn 1994:23). Empirically,
environmental concern has been found to be
stronger in younger people than in older (Jones
& Dunlap 1992; Scott & Willits 1994), but there
are indications that this relationship may have
weakened (Howell & Laska 1992) or even
disappeared (Hellevik 1996). However, shifts in
young people’s attitudes toward the environ-
ment have not received much research atten-
tion. Indeed, Furlong and Cartmel (1997)
conclude that there is a general deficiency
regarding our knowledge of young people’s
changing political orientations. They remark
that ’while there is a wealth of information on
changes in the political behavior of adults,
political scientists have tended to neglect the
study of youth’ (Furlong & Cartmel 1997:96).
Except class, two important factors could
be expected to influence both cultural identifi-
cation and environmental orientation, namely
gender and urbanization. It is commonly
postulated that relations to nature are influ-
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enced by gender. This is the very basis of
ecofeminism, a school of thought that claims
that women are closer to nature than men.
According to Jackson (1993) there seem to be
two pillars in ecofeminist thought: both women
and nature create and sustain life (and thus the
caring role of women is easily extended to caring
for nature), and both women and nature are
colonized and exploited within the male-domi-
nated, technocratic industrial society Further,
patriarchy has located women somewhere
between men and nature in a conceptual
hierarchy, accentuating the ’similar logic of
domination between the destruction of non-
human nature and the oppression of women’
(Eckersley 1992:64).
However, the gender differences that are
disclosed in empirical research are not always
’in favour’ of women (cf. Davidson & Freuden-
burg 1996). For example, Scott and Willits
(1994) found that environmental action, like
joining organizations and attending meetings,
was a predominantly male domain. On the
other hand, women were found to be more
inclined toward environmentally protective
consumer behaviour. They discovered no con-
sistent variations according to gender in atti-
tudes toward the environment and the general
role of humans in nature. Stern et al. (1993)
and Flynn et al. (1994) found that perception of
environmental dangers was generally stronger
among women. Stern and associates also
probed for gender differences in environmental
action or willingness to pay for improved
environmental conditions, but found none. A
Norwegian study found greater class differences
in environmental orientation among young
girls than among young boys, but the girls
were more concerned about the environment in
all classes (Skogen 1996). All in all, women’s
stronger concern in some areas seems well
established. We should expect an influence of
gender not only on environmental orientation
itself, but also on the relationship between
environmental orientation and culture pat-
terns. Several studies have concluded that
young women have been on the move to the
left on many political issues throughout Scan-
dinavia and the USA during the last decades
(Norris 1988; Oskarsson 1995). This possibly
reflects the educational and economic achieve-
ments made by women in this period, coupled
with a sense of solidarity (akin to caring) which
could be more characteristic of women than of
men.
The urban-rural axis is also thought to
influence environmental attitudes. But if this
idea is treated as a fact in the public discourse,
research has not shed much light on the
relationship. Whereas conflicts over large car-
nivores that kill livestock, forestry practices,
whaling, etc. obviously have an urban-rural
dimension, the operative mechanisms have not
been satisfactorily identified. It seems reason-
able to anticipate that various environmental
issues, affecting urban and rural people in
different ways, will be differently influenced by
the relationship - particularly what is perceived
as relations of power - between urban and rural
areas (cf. Dunk 1994). Youth cultural patterns
are also held to be influenced by an urban-rural
dimension, and this perspective has been
central in some recent qualitative studies
(Eidheim 1993; Jorgensen 1994). However,
the urban-rural differences are not unequivo-
cally corroborated by surveys, which have
indicated relatively minor differences in leisure
patterns (Skogen 1998). Further probing into
the complex matter of urbanization, culture
patterns and environmental orientation is
therefore needed, and some initial attempts
will be made here.
2. Research questions ..
Earlier studies have often focused on the
relationship between environmental orientation
and background factors like gender, class and
education. There is a need to move on from such
crudely defined variables to culture profiles
appearing in empirical research. The survey at
hand was designed to tap cultural differentia-
tion among youth (aged 15-22) to enable us to
probe the relationship between environmental
orientation and a broader cultural orientation.
It is also possible to investigate the influence of
the background factors gender, class and degree
of urbanization, both as to their ’direct’ effects
on environmental orientation and their possible
influence through the broader culture profiles -
which in turn are hypothesized to be tied to
such background factors. In this manner, we
can test the initial hypothesis that aspects of
environmental orientation are differently tied to
larger cultural packages, and that a pragmatic
environmental perspective should be less cultu-
rally distinct than environmental concern
implying a critical stance toward industrialism.
Concern for human well-being and health
risks is operationalized through anxiety regard-
ing the harmful effects of pollution. Such
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concern could be taken to reflect a pragmatic
perspective insofar as it is not tied to other and
more fundamentally critical attitudes. Endorse-
ment of a critical perspective is operationalized
through the so-called ’New Ecological Para-
digm’ scale (measuring aspects of the respon-
dents’ views on human relations to nature) and
attitudes towards economic growth.
The culture patterns are sought through
the respondents’ evaluation of a number of well-
known categories of youth, labelled in such a
way as to appear culturally clear-cut. Since
some culture patterns among youth are clearly
influenced by class background as well as
gender (cf. Skogen 1998), and possibly by
degree of urbanization, we must also investigate
the relationship between culture profiles and
these background factors.
The class model that is utilized includes a
distinction between two fractions within the
middle class. Gouldner (1979) saw the ’huma-
nistic intellectuals’ as one of two elites within
the same class (the ’new class’ or ’new middle
class’). The other elite was termed ’technical
intelligentsia’, and was described as firmly
situated within the production process or
economic sectors close to it. In this paper,
these fractions are labelled ’humanistic/social
intermediate strata’ (HSIS) and ’technical/eco-
nomic intermediate strata’ (TEIS), thereby
bypassing some of the difficulties connected to
the notion of elites as well as to the term ’new
class’. Important cultural differences between
these two fractions, and not least differences in
environmental orientation, have been estab-
lished in earlier research (Skogen 1996, 1998).
3. Method
This paper is based on data from the 1994 wave
of the ’Young in Norway’ panel study. The study
started in 1992 when a nationally representa-
tive sample (n = 12,287) of Norwegian lower
and upper secondary school students (ages 13
to 20) was drawn using schools as units. The
sample was drawn from areas that were
stratified according to region and school size.
The questionnaires were completed in school. In
Norway, 9 8 . 5 per cent of the age cohort from 13
to 16 attend the compulsory lower secondary
school; 90 per cent of the 16-year-olds were in
the first year of the upper secondary school in
October 1992. At the same time 77 per cent of
the 18-year-olds were in school, the decrease
being due to dropouts and courses that take less
than three years to complete. The response rate
in 1992 was 97.0 per cent.
In the 1994 follow-up, when the respon-
dents were aged 15 to 22, the sample was
reduced to 9,680 through the exclusion of four
schools. This did not influence the national
representativity of the sample. The response rate
was 80.1 per cent (n = 7,751). In 1994 about
half the students had left the school they
attended in 1992, and therefore received the
questionnaire by mail. In this group the
response rate was 67.9 per cent. Those who
were still in the same school completed their
questionnaires during school hours, and the
response rate was 91.8 per cent. The attrition
was of course not arbitrary. Knowing all
respondents in 1992, when the response rate
was extremely high, we can roughly sketch out
a typical non-respondent as a boy of working-
class background attending vocational courses
in 1992, with grades below average, seeing
himself as a worker at age 40, and who would
rather quit school if a job could be found. Such
attrition influences results, not least concerning
issues that are tied to social class and class
culture, where effects could possibly be dimin-
ished. However, the total response rate, even
that in the postal survey, is satisfactory com-
pared to what is usually obtained.
The broad range of the research project
necessitated a design where many questions
were only administered to half of the subjects
(every second student in every class in 1992).
This was the case with several questions that
are central to this analysis, and it is therefore
based on half the sample (n = 3,810).
4. Measures
Attitudes toward youth groups: culture
profiles
The respondents were presented with a list of 20
youth groups, each of which was assigned a
rather clich6 label, and asked to rate each on a
scale from 1 to 10 points, depending on how
well they liked the group. The purpose was to
lure the respondents into positioning them-
selves in a youth cultural landscape, something
which is often difficult if young people are asked
outright to do so. The youth groups are listed in
Table 1.
’Goals for the nation’
The respondents were asked to rate 16 possible
political goals for the nation from 1 to 10 points,
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depending on the importance they assigned to
each of them. Two are included in the present
analysis, namely ’protect the environment
against pollution’ and ’ensure continued eco-
nomic growth’. The first of these is not very
controversial today, and may serve as a crude
indicator of environmental concern based on
risk perception. The second goal relates to the
schism between ’deep’ and ’shallow’ ecology,
and a critical stance toward economic growth is
hypothesized to be part of a politically radical
attitude package.
The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP)
The New Ecological Paradigm scale is an
instrument designed to tap the endorsement of
an essentially ’ecocentric’ worldview (Dunlap &
Van Liere 1978; Dunlap et al. 1992). Dunlap
and associates claimed that endorsement of an
ecocentric paradigm could be interpreted as a
sign of departure from ways of thinking that
have been central to industrial capitalism.
Whether high scores on a survey instrument
could really be taken to indicate a shift in core
attitudes in western societies is at best uncer-
tain. It is, for instance, possible that the highest
scores on such an instrument are tied to
particular cultural and political patterns.
Whether the existence of such patterns heralds
a more widespread change in beliefs and values
is also uncertain. There seems to be little
empirical support for the view that critical
perspectives on industrial capitalism are gaining
hold within the general population.
As the NEP instrument seems to capture
some central elements of attitude patterns
concerning human relations to nature, and
has been used in other studies (e.g. Gooch
1995; Scott & Willits 1994), we decided to
employ it here. Bypassing the discussion of a
general attitude change, however, we have
chosen to regard it as a measure of critical
environmental orientation, and not a new
paradigm - although the label ’NEP’ is kept for
convenience.
The original instrument consists of 15
statements (Dunlap et al. 1992). We were
compelled to compress the instrument due to
limited space in the questionnaire, and selected
eight of the items, four expressing optimistic
views and four expressing pessimistic views or
troubled concern:
the balance of nature is very delicate and easily
upset.
. Humans have the right to modify the natural
environment to suit their needs.
. Humans are severely abusing the environment.
The so-called ’ecological crisis’ facing humankind
has been greatly exaggerated.
. Plants and animals have as much right as
humans to exist.
. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope
with the impact of modern industrial nations.
. If things continue on their present course, we will
soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.
. Human ingenuity will ensure that we do not
make the earth unliveable.
There has been some discussion as to whether
the NEP scale covers one or more dimensions of
environmental concern. In line with the argu-
ment of Dunlap and associates (1992), we have
considered it as one. The statements touch upon
very closely related themes, and it is hard to see
why they should relate to different attitude
patterns. This is possibly even more so with the
compressed eight-item version than the full size
instrument. The eight items had good internal
reliability (Alpha = .72). On this basis a sum
score variable (mean score on the eight items)
was constructed, and then employed as an
index intended to measure critical environmen-
tal orientation. 
z
Membership in environmental 
’
organizations
The respondents were asked to report whether
they were, or had been, members of an
environmental organization. Those who were
members in 1994 as well as those who had been
members at some earlier point were treated as
’members’ in the analysis, on the assumption
that both groups identify comparatively
strongly with the environmental movement,
and that resigning membership in this age
group is more often due to economic reasons,
moving, and so on, than to actual change of
attitude toward environmentalism.
Class
The class variable was constructed by categor-
izing parents’ occupations according to ISCO 88
(ILO 1990; Hoffmann 1993). Father’s occupa-
tion was primarily used as a basis for classifica-
tion, but where this information was lacking,
mother’s occupation was used instead. Occupa-
tions were grouped into the following six
categories: professional leaders, technical/eco-
nomic intermediate strata (TEIS), humanistic/
social intermediate strata (HSIS), clerical work-
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ers, farmers and fishermen, and manual work-
ers. Examples of occupations placed in the TEIS
category are engineers, economists and
researchers in technology, whereas occupations
like physicians, teachers, social workers and
artists were sorted into the HSIS category.
Using only one indicator to determine class
locations is always problematic. But class
analysis in empirical research is as much a
question of what is practically feasible as of
what theoretical model one wishes to employ.
Fortunately, the ’good enough’ class models
usually generate results very similar to those
obtained by more sophisticated measures
(Crompton 1993). However, any single measure
of class position should be expected to underplay
actual class differences (Davies 1994).
Urbanization
Degree of urbanization was scored on a five-
point scale ranging from ’small village or
countryside’ (coded 1) to ’city’ (coded 5).
5. Results
Culture profiles
Factor analysis was performed on the items in
the instrument measuring opinions of youth
groups. Oblique rotation (Kaiser’s normaliza-
tion, eigenvalue > 1 ) was chosen because of the
obvious possibility that there might be correla-
tion between factors (however, orthogonal
rotation yielded an identical factor solution).
Four factors emerged, as we can see from Table
1 - where the mean score for each item is also
reported. The factor scores were retained as
variables.
The first factor is characterized by high
esteem of youth groups belonging to traditional,
Table 1. Culture profiles, factor analysis.
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value-based organizations: scouts, members of
Christian associations, those who advocate the
use of local dialects and those who support
Amnesty International. We should note that
environmentalist youth also load highly on this
factor, although slightly higher on the third one.
The profile that thus emerges indicates identi-
fication with what we might call traditional
humanism. The second factor presented the
highest loadings in connection with the rating
of youth groups that could possibly best be
labelled conventional: ’Disco youth’, those who
go to youth clubs, those who strive for achieve-
ment in sports and in school, and even those
who participate in beauty contests. The third
factor clearly points to a politically radical
profile. Here we find high opinions of militant
anarchists,2 squatters, those who refuse mili-
tary service, gay youth, immigrant youth and
young environmentalists. This factor is labelled
radical counterculture. The fourth factor is in a
sense the extreme opposite of the third. It
comprises the highest ratings of youth who
are interested in weapons, cars and MCs and
youth who fight immigration. It also includes
particularly low ratings of immigrant youth,
and the second highest factor loadings on those
who take part in beauty contests and those who
like country music. This factor is, a little
ironically, labelled redneck. 3
Culture profiles, class and gender
Earlier research (cf. Skogen 1998) suggests a
relationship between class as well as gender and
at least some of the culture profiles, whereas the
status of urbanization is less clear. These back-
ground variables will be investigated as regards
their influence on environmental orientation
along with the culture profiles. As a first step,
linear regression was therefore performed to
disclose the relationship between the back-
ground variables and the culture profiles.
Urbanization was treated as an ordinal variable,
as degree of urbanization may be considered to
be increasing gradually. This is more proble-
matic regarding class, however, and therefore
dummy variables were constructed (Table 2).
The traditional humanism profile clearly
had the strongest position among girls, and
leaned slightly toward the rural. There were
also some modest class effects, as youth with a
HSIS, TEIS or farming/fishing background were
more inclined toward this profile compared to
those with a manual working-class back-
ground. The profile seems to encompass values
that are more typical of women than of men,
and seems to have a basis in a rural traditions of
participating in organizations as well as in some
core middle-class values. The inclusion of those
who like country music does indeed point to a
culture profile distant from the urban avant
garde.
The conventional profile was also more
predominant among girls. Some modest effects
of urbanization and class were found as well.
Living in rural areas and having a HSIS or
farming/fishing background decreased the like-
lihood of identifying with this profile. Youth,
and boys in particular, with a class background
that in a sense ties them to core processes in
capitalism did indeed endorse this profile some-
what more than others. Being critical of the
values comprised in it was most typical of the
HSIS and farming/fishing youth. As with the
traditional humanism profile, there seem to be
some ties between culture elements prevalent in
these two groups: in this case disregard for
certain forms of competitiveness, as well as
commercial and sexist pastimes (beauty con-
tests).
Girls were much more positive than boys
toward the radical counterculture profile. Ur-
banization once again played a modest role
(tending toward the urban), whereas some quite
substantial class effects were found. Having a
HSIS background increased the likelihood of
endorsing the profile, as did - to a lesser degree -
having parents who belonged to the TEIS. This
points in the same direction as earlier research
on new social movement support, where a
primary base in ’the new middle class’ has
generally been found. A high factor score on the
radical counterculture profile most likely indi-
cates a cultural orientation similar to that found
in the typical new social movement constitu-
ency.
The redneck profile was almost the exact
opposite of the radical counterculture regarding
gender, urbanization and class. There was a
strong effect of being a boy. This is not
surprising, given the obvious macho quality of
some of the items that dominate the factor
score. The profile was also more strongly tied to
the urbanization variable than the others, being
most typical of rural areas. There were negative
effects of all class backgrounds except farming/
fishing compared to the manual working class;
strongest having a HSIS background and barely
significant having parents who were clerical
workers. This is supportive of earlier research,
which indicates that working-class youth cul-
ture (and the culture of youth with a farming/
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Table 2. Culture profiles, linear regression with gender, urbanization and class.
*** 
p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
fishing background) holds physical masculine
toughness and its symbolic expressions (in this
case cars, MCs, weapons) in high esteem
(Jorgensen 1994; Skogen 1998). Skepticism
toward immigrants or outright racism has also
been found to be most predominant in working-
class youth, and particularly in boys (Pedersen
1996).
Culture profiles and environmental
orientation
Linear regression was performed to disclose the
associations between the environmental orien-
tation variables, the background factors gender,
urbanization and class, and the four culture
profile factor scores. The variables were intro-
duced in two blocks in order to determine the
additional effect of the culture profiles compared
to the background factors.
The mean score on the fighting pollution
variable was 8.6 on the scale from 1 to 10
(SD = 1.8), indicating a widespread concern. As
we can see from Table 3, gender was the only
background variable that influenced the rating
(the first block, without the culture profiles):
girls thought this more important than did boys.
Entering the culture profiles into the model
demonstrated significant effects of all of them,
and yielded a significant increase in explained
variance (RZ change: p <.0001). The impor-
tance assigned to protecting the environment
against pollution was positively associated with
the scores on the traditional humanism profile
and the conventional profile, as well as, to a
somewhat lesser degree, the radical counter-
culture profile. It was negatively associated with
the redneck profile. Entering the second block
also brought out a significant positive (although
modest) effect of increasing degree of urbaniza-
tion. This is probably due to the urban-rural
distribution of the culture profiles. For example,
the strongly ’anti-pollution’ traditional human-
ism profile is more predominant in rural areas.
When ’cleaned’ of this effect, a general, but very
modest tendency toward less concern for pollu-
tion in rural areas is disclosed.
The NEP sum score had a mean of 3.9 on
the scale from 1 to 5 (SD = .6), indicating a
predominant positive evaluation of the envir-
onmentally benign dimension comprised in it.
The score was related to gender (girls scored
higher than boys) and class (Table 4). There
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Table 3. Fighting pollution, linear regression with background factors and culture profiles.
***p<.001, **p<.01, * p <.05.
were positive effects of belonging to both middle-
class groups, although strongest with a HSIS
background. Introducing the culture profiles
considerably weakened the effect of gender. The
effect of a HSIS background was also weakened,
and the effect of a TEIS background disap-
peared. All culture profiles displayed significant
effects and contributed to a significant increase
in the explained variance (R2 2 change:
p < .0001). The positive effect of a high score
on the radical counterculture profile was
strongest, followed by the positive effect of
scoring high on the traditional humanism
profile, and the negative effect of scoring high
on the redneck profile. There was, finally, a
modest negative effect of the conventional
profile. In block 2, the original effects of class
were channelled through the culture profiles,
which were themselves tied to class background
(as we saw in Table 2).
Table 4. NEP endorsement, linear regression with background factors and culture profiles.
*** p <.001, **p<.01, * p <.05.
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Table 5. Economic growth, linear regression with background factors and culture profiles.
***p<.001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
a p = .052.
b p = .051.
~ The standard error dropped from .122 to .117 when introducing the second block, giving p = .02 7.
Table 6. Membership in environmental organizations, logistic regression with background factors, environmental orientation
and culture profiles.
*** 
p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
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Economic growth had a mean score of 6.1
on the scale from 1 to 10 (SD = 1.8), consider-
ably lower than fighting pollution. The impor-
tance assigned to this goal was related to gender
(boys more positive than girls) and class
(negative effect of a HSIS background), before
entering the culture profiles. Introducing them
yielded significant effects of all. The strongest
effect was the positive one of scoring high on the
conventional profile. Viewing economic growth
as important was negatively related to the score
on radical counterculture. There were more
modest positive associations with scores on the
traditional humanism and redneck profiles. The
effect of gender remained undiminished, but the
class effects followed different paths in the
second block. The positive effect of having
professional leader parents became significant
at the .05 level when controlling for the culture
profiles, but this was due only to a slight drop in
the standard error (see note in Table 5). The
effect of a HSIS background was weakened, and
seems to be partly channelled through the
radical counterculture profile.
The direct effects of class on environmental
orientation paralleled the differences between
vocationally trained working-class youth and
academically trained HSIS youth, effects which
have been demonstrated through earlier
research (Skogen 1996). As we have seen,
these effects were modest where they appeared,
and tended to weaken or vanish when the
culture profiles were introduced.
If we start with the radical counterculture
profile, one possible interpretation is that those
who identify strongly with it (and thus typically
harbour a critical environmental orientation)
are most frequently located within the HSIS, but
are not so numerous as to effect any major
influence on the direct relationship between
class and environmental orientation (which is
there, but not strong). Conversely, the moderate
effects on environmental orientation of a
manual class background, despite the high
redneck scores among working-class and farm-
ing/fishing youth, could be due to a relatively
modest number of ’hard-core rednecks’ even
among those with such a class background.
This interpretation is to some degree substan-
tiated by the distribution within the class model
of the respondents who score highest on these
two culture profiles. Respondents within the
quartile with highest scores on the radical
counterculture profile comprised 40 per cent
within the HSIS, which is almost 12 per cent
more than within the TEIS, the category with
the second highest proportion of such ’counter-
culturists’. If we move on to those 10 per cent
with the ultimate high scores, we find that this
counterculture elite makes up 19 per cent of the
HSIS. This is almost double the proportion
within the TEIS, but probably still not enough to
enact any major influence upon the relationship
between class and environmental orientation.
Similarly, if we look at the redneck profile,
we find that the respondents falling within the
highest scoring quartile make up over 30 per
cent within the manual working class as well as
within the farming/fishing category. This is 8
per cent more than within the category with the
second strongest redneck affinity, the profes-
sional leaders. The hard-core top 10 per cent of
the sample make up 14-15 per cent of the
manual working class and farming/fishing
category. This is close to double the proportion
within the professional leaders category, but
apparently not enough to influence the statis-
tical relationship between class and environ-
mental orientation in any substantial way. All in
all, it seems reasonable to assume an impact of
class, but one that is mainly working through
the culture profiles, particularly radical coun-
terculture and redneck.
Membership in environmental
organizations in relation to environmental
orientation and culture profiles
In all, 8.0 per cent of the girls and 5.6 per cent of
the boys were members of an environmental
organization or had been previously. Logistic
regression was performed in two blocks. The
first block contained the background variables
and the environmental orientation variables.
The second block also included the culture
profile variables. The intention was to investi-
gate the effects of the culture profiles on the
propensity to join environmental organizations
as compared to the effects of the background
variables and the different aspects of environ-
mental orientation.
The first block demonstrated that the
chance of belonging to an organization (now
or recently) was significantly greater for those of
HSIS or TEIS backgrounds (Table 6). It
decreased with the score on the economic
growth variable (the Wald indicating that this
was the strongest effect in block 1), and
increased with the scores on the NEP scale
and the pollution prevention variable (the latter
being the weakest of the environmental orienta-
tion effects). Introducing the culture profiles in
block 2 demonstrated that scores on all profiles
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except traditional humanism significantly influ-
enced the probability of belonging to an
environmental organization. An inspection of
the Wald values shows that high scores on the
radical counterculture profile and negative
attitudes to economic growth had the strongest
effects, although the impact of the attitude to
economic growth was weakened compared to
block 1. The NEP score also lost much of its
impact through the introduction of the culture
profiles. These effects now seem to be partly
funnelled through the radical counterculture
variable. There were significant negative effects
of the conventional and redneck profiles, and
these probably also sucked up some of the effects
of economic growth attitude and NEP score. The
class effects were somewhat smaller when
controlled for the culture profiles, but they
remained significant. There was no effect of
gender, nor of urbanization, when the other
variables were controlled for.
6. Discussion
The findings go some way toward supporting
the initial hypothesis: environmental awareness
that can be tied to worries concerning indivi-
dual risk (a pragmatic perspective) is indeed less
culturally specific than awareness that is part of
a comprehensive critical perspective. The latter
is quite closely connected to a culture profile
that may be discerned through a positive
evaluation of youth groups that in various
ways are tied to a politically radical ideology,
and could be taken to comprise a critical stance
toward many sides of contemporary society. A
critical attitude toward economic growth,
coupled with endorsement of NEP, is thus part
of a rather specific cultural package, with a class
basis reminiscent of that which many studies
have found regarding the core of the environ-
mental movement. This is not the case with the
desire to curb pollution, which is in fact less
strongly tied to the radical counterculture
profile than to the conventional and traditional
humanist profiles. This issue is now probably
rather uncontroversial, and as much a source of
worry to the conventional respondents (who
give a high priority to economic growth) as to
the radicals (who do not). Treating this state-
ment as indicative of a pragmatic orientation is
also supported by its high mean score, indicat-
ing broad support. The redneck profile is the
only one that is negatively associated also with
the pollution variable. The redneck and radical
counterculture profiles constitute the extremes
regarding environmental orientation. The red-
neck profile is consistently negatively related to
the ’environment friendly’ attitudes, whereas
the radical counterculture profile is the only one
that is consistently positively related to them.
The relationship between culture profiles
and environmental orientation variables is such
that a funnel is formed, leading from a very
broad and general positive correlation between
desire to combat pollution and no less than
three of the culture profiles, to the exclusive
relationship between the radical counterculture
profile and negative attitudes toward economic
growth. This could be seen as a movement from
a pragmatic to a critical ecological paradigm,
and at the same time a movement toward a
higher cultural specificity.
The radical counterculture and redneck
profiles are quite distinctly tied to class back-
ground. Thus, reproduction of class cultural
patterns across generations seems apparent as
the respondents are classified according to their
parents’ occupations. We should understand
such continuity partly against a background of
internalization of the parent culture in child-
hood, and partly as the outcome of dynamic
cultural response to conditions that resemble
those faced by the parental generation, and
which therefore generate similar cultural forms
(for a more thorough discussion, see Skogen
1998).
Among our variables, the NEP scale is not
the one that distinguishes most clearly among
the culture profiles. It is quite strongly tied to the
radical counterculture profile, but also to the
traditional humanism profile. The negative
evaluation of economic growth, however, is
exclusively tied to the radical counterculture
profile, and thus seems to be the most culturally,
or ideologically, narrow. This indicates that the
NEP scale does not necessarily point to a ’critical
paradigm’ in any strict sense, as it is entirely
possible to endorse both NEP and economic
growth - as those who score high on traditional
humanism typically do. It therefore casts some
doubt on the capability of the NEP scale to
measure adequately an ecocentric orientation
as opposed to an anthropocentric one.
We now turn to the two culture profiles
that are less clearly tied to environmental
orientation and class. The conventional profile
includes positive attitudes toward competitive-
ness (in education and sports), focus on beauty
and fashion, as well as pleasure-seeking (com-
mercial) pastimes. The acceptance of competi-
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tiveness points in the direction of individualist
attitudes, but we should not over-emphasize
this. The higher scores among girls, along with
the higher factor loadings on items concerning
fashion and beauty, indicate that what we are
facing here is chiefly an orientation toward
some core values in modern society, and a
corresponding rejection of departures from the
mainstream route leading to a form of happi-
ness and success that some would regard as
superficial. It may appear odd that this profile is
so weakly tied to class, and perhaps particularly
that there seems to be as much endorsement of
such a school-oriented profile within the work-
ing class as elsewhere. However, while some
studies have concluded that working-class
youth are often adverse to competitiveness in
school, others have pointed to the diversity of
responses to school among working-class
youngsters, and that a pragmatic acceptance
of education as a necessary evil is perhaps the
most common (cf. Brown 1987). The only
category standing out in relation to the
conventional profile is the HSIS, which is in
accordance with a generally critical attitude
found here, mirrored in the endorsement of the
radical counterculture profile. It seems reason-
able that the pragmatic individual-risk-percep-
tion perspective (expressed through worries
concerning pollution, a threat to individual
health and happiness) is in accordance with the
conventional profile. It is also more predomi-
nant among girls, who are more prone to worry
about environmental safety (cf. Flynn et al.
1994; Stern et al. 1993). Actually, those who
subscribe to conventional values are more
concerned with pollution than those who
identify with radical counterculture. On the
other hand, controversial and critical environ-
mental attitudes are less agreeable to those with
a strong conventional orientation.
A central element in the traditional
humanism profile is the positive attitude toward
members of traditional youth organizations
(scouts, Christian youth, and those engaged on
the ’rural side’ in the peculiar Norwegian
language dispute), as well as some more modern
ones, namely Amnesty International and
indeed environmental youth organizations.
This seems to indicate adherence to values
that are central to major traditional organiza-
tions, and which could be construed as, among
other things, a sort of responsible concern, that
is, concern without desire for revolt against
existing political structures. The traditional
humanism profile is tied to our environmental
orientation variables in ways that indicate
precisely such a responsible, within-system
concern. Perhaps we could even chance label-
ling it an anthropocentric pro-environmental
orientation. For although the traditional huma-
nists actually endorse the NEP, they are not
adverse to economic growth. And this could
arguably be seen as a ’litmus test’ of a critical
environmental orientation (Eckersley 1992).
In Norway, one environmental organiza-
tion is totally dominant in the age group at
hand, namely ’Natur og ungdom’ (Nature and
Youth), the youth organization of ’Norges
Naturvernforbund’ (The Norwegian Society for
the Conservation of Nature). It is more radical
than its parent organization, and generally
emphasizes the political context in which
environmental issues should be seen. Member-
ship in an environmental organization is there-
fore probably an even stronger indicator of
endorsement of a critical ecological paradigm
than that expressed by a critical attitude toward
economic growth. Membership seems deter-
mined by identification with the radical coun-
terculture profile more than by any of the
measures of environmental orientation. Among
the latter, a critical attitude toward economic
growth is clearly the strongest predictor. As we
have seen, this environmental orientation
measure was itself most exclusively tied to the
radical counterculture profile.
In the remaining discussion we shall
concentrate on those two culture profiles that
form the most distinct patterns in relation to
environmental orientation and class, namely
the radical counterculture profile with its HSIS
affiliation, and the redneck profile with its basis
in the manual classes. These patterns signify a
class-related cultural polarization, the analysis
of which could help us comprehend some
central cultural mechanisms in operation here.
The HSIS domination within the environ-
mental movement has long been a central focus
in analyses of the societal dynamics involved in
its formation. For example, Cotgrove and Duff
(1980) point to the alienation experienced by
groups in the non-productive sector of indus-
trial capitalist societies. In the eyes of these
middle-class fractions, the destruction of nature
is but one of the undesirable consequences of an
unjust economic and social system (cf. Scott
1990). However, involvement in the environ-
mental movement clearly cannot presuppose
subjective recognition of class interests in a
socio-economic sense. Earlier research has
indicated that ties to two basic culture patterns
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influence the environmental orientation of
Norwegian youth (Skogen 1996). The ’abstrac-
tion-oriented culture’ and the ’production-
oriented culture’ were seen as originating from
different class bases. The particular affinity
toward the environmental movement found
among HSIS youth was interpreted in light of
this class fraction’s cultural roots in the
abstraction-oriented culture (which they largely
share with the upper class and TEIS), and their
perceived independence from material produc-
tion and the marketplace. The same perspective
would seem to cover the affinity toward a
critical ecological paradigm which was uncov-
ered in the present study.
Abstraction and the related process of
aesthetization relate to concepts of nature in
important ways. The abstraction-oriented cul-
ture provides a disposition toward aesthetic
evaluation of nature, as well as identification
with abstract totalities (all living things, our
planet, mother earth, etc.). Rejection of crude
materialism, conceived as the cause behind
destructive exploitation of nature, also fits the
picture. According to Bourdieu, the aesthetiza-
tion typical of the dominant classes fills its
cultural ’function’ partly through a demon-
stration of distance from ’the natural and
social world’ (Bourdieu 1984:5), i.e. in this
case from the necessity of actually manipulat-
ing nature.
Youth of working-class background were
influenced by a different cultural location, in
that they were rooted in a production-oriented
culture and culturally linked to material pro-
duction and thereby to the core economic
processes in capitalism (Skogen 1996). The
strongly male-dominated redneck profile identi-
fied here, with its basis among working class
and farming/fishing youth, appears to signify a
cultural foundation for a negative attitude
toward environmentalism. This profile is remi-
niscent of core elements in the production-
oriented culture, as these have been described in
many ethnographic studies of working-class
youth (cf. Dunk 1991; Jorgensen 1994; Weis
1990), as well as in some surveys (cf. Skogen
1998). The profile’s class basis itself further
accentuates this link.
The stronger environmental concern found
among girls does indicate that gender is an
operative factor, perhaps along the lines sug-
gested by Stern and associates (1993) and
Flynn and associates (1994), as well as David-
son and Freudenburg (1996): women are more
aware of environmental risks, and this could
again be connected to a caring attitude central
to the female gender role. Gilligan (1982)
maintains that women are oriented toward
interpersonal relationships, which results in
the development of a characteristic female
’ethics of caring’. It also points in the same
direction as studies of voting behaviour and
political orientation, which conclude that
young women have become more radical than
young men, not least concerning issues like
nuclear power and environmental safety (cf.
Norris 1988). However, regarding organization
membership, there is no remaining effect of
gender when controlling for the environmental
orientation variables. This is explained by the
fact that girls score higher than boys do on these
variables, so that their actually higher propen-
sity to join environmental organizations is
explained by their stronger endorsement of
such environmental attitudes that predict
membership. There is no additional effect of
gender when this is taken into account. Further,
the girls’ higher scores on the ’conventional’
profile, with its elements of competition and
individual achievement, and certainly its posi-
tive correlation with the ’economic growth’
variable, modifies the picture of radical girls.
This could point to a more marked diversity
among girls than among boys, and is corrobo-
rated by the larger class differences among girls
regarding environmental orientation that were
established in an earlier study (Skogen 1996).
There are some modest effects of urbaniza-
tion working through the culture profiles. Only
the redneck profile is distinctly influenced by the
urban-rural dimension. The particular role of
such a culture profile in some environmental
disputes is interesting, and should be pursued in
qualitative research. Still, the main impression
is that the effects of urbanization are not very
important, even regarding membership in
environmental organizations,4 which may
seem surprising. This indicates that environ-
mental attitudes measured on a general level
are not strongly affected by urban-rural polar-
ization. Whether this is a new development -
which one might think considering the widely
held opinion that modern environmentalism is
an urban phenomenon - is impossible to tell
from the data at hand. However, it is possible
that some earlier accounts of urban-rural
conflicts over environmental matters have for-
gotten the issue of class and class cultures,
which seems to cut across the urban-rural
dimension, whereas some groups with strong
opinions on certain issues - say, the protection
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of large carnivores and old-growth forests or the
ban on whaling - such as farmers, fishermen
and the rural working class, are of course
chiefly found in rural areas. Those groups that
support environmentalism in the cities are likely
to do so also in rural areas, only they may not be
so numerous there. There is clearly a need for
more research addressing the urban-rural
dimension explicitly.
This study has demonstrated that young
people’s environmental orientation is hetero-
geneous and tied in multiple ways to broader
cultural patterns. It is not surprising that
environmental orientation is comprised in
packages of attitudes and beliefs, but this fact
is often ignored by government agencies and
environmental organizations in their attempts
to communicate with the public. The diversity
has also been inadequately covered in research,
and even the present study, with its crude
survey measures, leaves much to be desired.
Further probing into cultural interpretations of
environmental issues will require qualitative
studies where we can really get at meanings and
their contexts.
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1 Including young environmentalists in the instrument
may seem problematic when the intention is to investigate
relationships between the ensuing factors and environmental
orientation. However, removing the category does not influence
the factor structure or the relationship between factors and
other variables, and it may therefore be kept in the analysis.
2 Youth from ’Blitz’, a fairly large, loosely organized group
in Oslo that is well known nationally because of its militant
actions.
3 
’Redneck’ is an American term, an ironic (sometimes
derogatory) nickname for those parts of the working class that
harbor reactionary and racist views, particularly in rural areas.
4 Even a simple cross-table shows no significant difference
between cities and rural areas when it comes to membership.
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